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It might appear strange that bananas should have represented one of the last remaining 
threats to the successful conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round. France sought to 
maintain the protection the EU had established for ACP (African, Caribbean and 
Pacific) suppliers, while Germany refused to accept the GATT accord in case it 
weakened its challenge to the existing EU banana regime that it was challenging in 
the European Court. These difficulties were a continuation of the internal conflict 
within the EU which had its origins in the EU's attempt to establish a new regime to 
regulate the import of bananas under the single market programme. 
The EU accounts for approximately one-third of world imports of bananas, which in 
1992 were worth ECU 20 bn. Prior to 1993 the EU banana market had been 
fragmented by national import controls. Half of the EU's member states operated such 
schemes covering 40% of EU imports and ensuring preference for their traditional 
`colonial' suppliers and overseas territories (DOMs - Departements d'Outre-Mer). 
Spain obtained most of its bananas from the Canary Islands; Portugal from Madeira; 
France from Martinique and Guadeloupe, the Cameroons and the Ivory Coast; the UK 
from the Windward Islands, Belize and Jamaica (See Table 1). By contrast Germany, 
the largest EU market for bananas, allowed tariff free imports and was supplied by the 
more efficient Central and South American producers, who with their large scale 
irrigated plantation based production obtain yields double those of the ACP 
producers. Except in Germany `dollar' banana producers faced a Common External 
Tariff of 20%, while ACP imports entered duty-free under the Lomé Conventions (see 
also Table 2). 
The removal of the internal barriers to trade with the creation of the EUs single 
market required the elimination of these different national import controls. It is the 
evolution of a common EU import regime for bananas that will be reviewed in this 
article, together with an examination of the importance of this product for the 
economies of a number of Caribbean island economies. 
The Policy Options 
Although the EU maintained a CET (Common External Tariff) of 20% on banana 
imports, with the exception of Germany, there was also considerable variation in 
national import controls. The UK offered duty-free access to ACP producers and in 
addition dollar banana imports were controlled by import licensing. Dollar banana 
import licenses guaranteed access for a minimum of 30,000 tons annually, with 
additional licenses should traditional suppliers fail to meet domestic demand. 
Similarly sixty per cent of the French market was supplied by its Overseas 
Departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe, with further imports supplied by African 
Franc zone countries such as Cameroon. Dollar imports were subject to licensing 
which would only be granted if prices exceeded certain levels. Italy granted free 
access to ACP imports, with Somalia being offered preferential status, but restricted 
other imports to a global quota which in 1983 was 270,000 tons. Spain was supplied 
by the Canary Islands and Portugal by Madeira and both excluded supplies from other 
sources. The estimated welfare loss of this system of import controls ranged from 
ECU 425 m. (Read 1993) to ECU 1.3 bn. (Borrell & Yang 1990,1992).  
Faced with the demands of establishing a single market a number of options presented 
themselves to the Community. The problem could have been circumvented by 
allowing derogations to some of the member states to continue their import controls. 
Although the perishable nature of the product and the dominance of the market by a 
limited number of importing companies might have made this possible, it offered no 
long-term solution. At the other extreme a free market could have been established 
following the German example. 
The consequences for EU consumers, ACP suppliers and dollar producers of the 
various policy options has been evaluated Borrell and Yang (1990). Following the 
analysis of Noich (1985) they suggest that the overall effect of the existing policies of 
the EU had been to increase world prices, subsidise favoured supplying countries and 
consumers in Germany at the expense of non-favoured dollar producers and of 
consumers in the remaining EU member states who restrict access to their markets. 
Borrell and Yang evaluated the impact of four policy options; the extension of free 
trade to the whole Community, the adoption of a CET of 20% on all imports, a system 
of deficiency payments and direct aid payments. The adoption of free trade in bananas 
was found to raise EU consumption by 9%. Dollar banana imports would increase by 
12% but ACP suppliers would see their exports fall by 46%. Although EU consumers 
experience a gain in economic welfare of $386 m. (in 1987 dollars) annually and 
dollar exporters gain $61 m. from access to the EU market and higher world prices, 
ACP countries lose $209 m. each year. These loses are substantial when compared to 
the value of ACP banana exports to the EU which totalled $576 m. in 1987. 
Turning to the extension of a CET of 20% to Germany, with continuing ACP duty-
free access to the Community, German consumers experience a substantial welfare 
loss of $85 m. Alternatively the ACP tariff concessions could be abandoned. This 
produces a smaller global welfare lose than the previous case since a non-
discriminatory tariff allows rationalisation of production between exporters. However 
such rationalisation will again be at the expense of the ACP producers who will 
experience substantial loses. To address this problem a deficiency payment system 
might be established financed by a CET. Such deficiency payments would be received 
by the ACPs to cover the difference between the world price they would receive and 
their current protected prices. Borrell and Yang calculate that a tariff of 16.7% would 
be required to finance such a scheme. Again German consumers would be the major 
losers of such an approach. 
However Borrell and Young favoured direct aid payments financed by a CET of 
16.1%. Deficiency payments would encourage production in the ACP exporters by 
artificially raising prices. By contrast direct aid minimises the distortion to world 
trade and allows the targeting of assistance to diversification of the ACP economies. 
They estimate that direct aid payments to ACP exporters would total $273 m. 
annually, an increase of $64 m. on the existing level of implicit benefit from 
discriminatory tariffs. However it would still result in the same 47% reduction in ACP 
banana exports as in the free trade scenario. The impact upon some ACP countries of 
such a dramatic structural transformation of their economies is not easily dismissed 
and is an issue to which I shall return when we examine the nature of some island 
economies. 
Davenport and Page (1991) carried out a similar simulation of the alternative regimes 
that might be introduced. They examined three cases; removal of quantitative limits 
on imports with a CET, deficiency payments and a quota system. With only a CET 
restricting imports, without any ACP preference, prices would fall to those prevailing 
in those member states with unrestricted dollar banana imports - ie. Belgium, 
Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands. This was approximately ECU 4.5 per kilo, 
compared with a price of ECU 7 for EC bananas, ECU 4.5 - 6 for African imports and 
ECU 6 for Windward Island bananas. The competitiveness of ACP bananas is such 
that their market share falls from 52% to 28%, reducing their export earnings by 75%. 
Were the ACP’s to be compensated for these losses at a rate of ECU 165 per tonne, 
Davenport and Page estimate that the cost to the EU would total ECU 200 m. (based 
upon 1988 prices and volumes). 
Deficiency payments, to supplement EU and ACP producers incomes from world 
prices in a free market, would still encourage these producers to become more 
efficient. However unless the deficiency payments differentiated between producing 
countries the least competitive (eg. the Windward Islands) would still lose market 
share. The cost of such a scheme could be high unless financed, as suggested by 
Borrell and Yang, from retaining a CET on dollar banana imports. Davenport and 
Page find that price guarantees at ECU 7 per kilo for EU producers and at ECU 5 per 
kilo for ACP suppliers, financed in part by a CET of 14%, would still result in a 16% 
fall in ACP exports and a decline in export earnings of 24%. 
A quota system would involve establishing limits on EU imports of dollar bananas, 
with a lower CET. ACP bananas would continue their unrestricted duty-free entry into 
the EU market. The larger the initial size of the dollar banana quota and the greater its 
growth rate, the lower will be the Community's price of bananas but the smaller the 
ACP’s share of the market. The price of bananas will also be lower if an overall dollar 
import quota is established within which producers had to compete, perhaps by 
auction, for licenses. 
It was also possible to adopt a mixed scheme, eg. of deficiency payments and quotas. 
However any import regime would still have to reconcile the trade-off between the 
maintenance of ACPs market shares and the loss of EU consumer surplus from higher 
EU banana prices above the free-market world level. 
Import Trends 
In 1982 the EC10 imported 1.87 million metric tonnes of bananas, approximately one-
third of world imports. Of this total 17.6% (0.33 m. tonnes) was imported from the 
ACP countries. Over the ten years to 1992 EC12 imports increased by 116% to 4.0m. 
tonnes, with ACP exports doubling to 0.7 m. tonnes, worth ECU 413 m. Over this 
period the ACP share of EU imports has been unstable (Fig.1), peaking at 25% in 
1986 and declining to 15.4% by 1992. The decline in the ACP market share in 1991 
and 1992 resulted from the dumping of surplus tonnages of dollar bananas and was 
regarded by some ACP producers as an attempt to to capture market share in 
anticipation of the SEM. 
Germany represents one-third of the EU market for bananas, supplied exclusively by 
low priced dollar banana producers. Spain, Italy, France and the UK each account for 
10%-14% of the total market. The UK imports 90% of its bananas from ACP 
countries, with 52% coming from the Windward Islands. France imports 59% of its 
bananas from the Overseas Territories of Guadeloupe and Martinique, while Spain 
imports all of its bananas from the Canary Islands. Except for its imports from 
Somalia (15%) Italy relies on dollar banana imports. 
The distribution of bananas is dominated by three US Multi-national companies 
(MNC) - United Brands (formally the United Fruit Co.), Castle & Cooke (formally 
the Standard Fruit Co.) and the Del Monte Corporation. The latter entered the industry 
in 1967 through the purchase of the West Indies Fruit Co. These companies are 
principally concerned with supplying the US market from Central and South America, 
but through subsidiaries (eg. United Fruit's Elders & Fyffes) they also supply Europe. 
In 1980 63% of world exports of bananas were controlled by these MNCs (Read 
1986). Their vertical integration had allowed them to resist new entrants. Nonetheless, 
in recent years they have withdrawn from the direct ownership of their specialist 
shipping and reduced their own plantation production. In 1974-76 United Fruit 
produced 75% of it's bananas from it's own plantations, but Standard Fruit relied on 
contracting independent producers for 53% of it's bananas and Del Monte for 57%. 
They have also faced a challenge from an inter-governmental owned banana company 
(Comunbana), the marketing arm of the Union de Paises Exportadores de Banano 
(UPEB). Formed in 1974 it is a producers association including all of the banana 
producing countries of Central America. Its principal market was the US, but it also 
exported to Greece and Italy. However in 1983 the company ceased trading, ending 
government attempts to gain a foothold in the international market. 
The Caribbean Island Economies 
Banana exports are important to a number of the islands of the Caribbean. Martinique 
and Guadeloupe are external territories of the EU and the volume of their exports is 
illustrated in Fig.2. In 1972 Guadeloupe was exporting 121,110 tonnes of bananas to 
France and Martinique 185,823 tonnes, by 1982 this was little changed for 
Guadeloupe at 120,921 tonnes, but Martinique's exports had fallen by 25,000 tonnes 
to 159,405 tonnes. Both islands experienced a substantial decline in the volume of 
banana exports from 1987 to 1989, followed by a recovery; however their share of the 
EU market actually increased over these years (Fig.3) reflecting the smaller decline in 
French imports ((31%) compared with the Community average (39%). For both 
islands bananas are an important source of foreign currency generating approximately 
50% of their total merchandised export earnings. As high cost producers, especially as 
both islands are covered by French minimum wage laws, their exports are confined to 
France. 
Banana production in Jamaica began very early in 1901 and exports to the UK peaked 
at 300,000 tonnes. However in the 1970s the industry went into decline and by 1974 it 
was exporting only 66,800 tonnes. In 1981 a fundamental review of the industry took 
place, with the formation of BECO (the Banana Export Company) to help in 
restructuring production and marketing. Investment, funded by the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (£11.8m.) and the International Finance Corporation 
(£3.8m.) has been concentrated in three large plantations and yields, as a 
consequence, are comparable to those of the Latin and Central American suppliers. 
By 1990 it produced 128,000 tonnes of bananas and exported 63,181 tonnes to the 
UK, its only EU market. As the volume of bananas exported to the EU has increased 
(Fig.4) it has taken an increasing share of Jamaica's total banana exports. In 1989 
Jamaica exported 43,000 tonnes, but only 20,000 tonnes to the Community. By 1991 
93% of its banana exports were to the EU and totalled 70,000 tonnes. Over the whole 
ten year period 1982-92 Jamaican banana exports to the EU tripled, the increase 
occurring in the years 1989-1992 and reflected in an increase in its EU market share 
(Fig.5). However Jamaica is a diversified economy and banana exports represented 
only 4% of its $1157m. of merchandised exports, although 34% of its $132 m. of non-
fuel primary exports. 
Jamaica was one of the earliest countries to attempt to break the control of the US 
MNCs. In 1929 the Jamaican Banana Exporters Association had been formed to offer 
a centralised export agency for the 6,000 small growers. It signed sales agreements 
with Standard Fruit, acquired part-ownership of some shipping and established a 
European marketing subsidiary. It was succeeded by the Jamaican Banana Board in 
1947, which sells directly to wholesalers in the UK and through Elders & Fyffes. The 
Board has also been active in introducing new disease-resistant varieties and new 
packaging. 
The Windward Islands 
The Windward Islands of Dominica, Grenada, St.Vincent and St.Lucia are all 
independent countries and as such gain access to the EU under the Lomé trade 
concessions. Unlike Jamaica, bananas are of far greater significance to their 
economies. Bananas are one of the most labour intensive crops produced and account 
for between 23% and 34% of agricultural employment in these islands, itself one-third 
of all employment (Thomas 1989a). Banana production for export had expanded 
rapidly in the 1950s, encouraged by the UK government as a substitute for the 
declining sugar industry. First the large sugar estates diversified, to be followed by the 
smaller farmers. Production peaked in 1969 before the increase in costs following the 
1972 oil price shock. Production was also adversely affected by hurricanes in 1979 
and 1980. Estate production declined throughout the 1970s so that today bananas are 
principally produced by small and medium sized farmers (eg. 97% of production in 
Dominica is by farmers with less than 10 acres) (Thomas 1989a). It is estimated that 
banana production employs, directly and indirectly, 31% of the Windward Islands 
labour force (House of Commons, Agricultural Com. 1992). As with Jamaica each 
Island has a Producers' Association which has a statutory monopoly on the sale of 
bananas. These Associations in turn had an exclusive marketing contracts with Geest, 
which controlled 45% of the UK market. 
St.Lucia and St.Vincent only export to the EU and have shared a substantial increase 
in their exports, increasing by 200% and 170% respectively between 1982 and 1992 
(Figs.4 & 5). Banana exports for St.Lucia in 1991 at $54.8 m. represented 54% of all 
export earnings, while for St.Vincent they were 50% of merchandised exports at $33 
m. Banana production accounts for 36% of agricultural employment in St.Lucia and 
21% in St.Vincent. Except for 1986 their share of the EU market has been steady at 
approximately 3% and 2% respectively. 
Dominica has shared in the increase in its volume of exports to the EU, doubling from 
26,438 tonnes in 1982 to 55,932 tonnes in 1992, with their share of the EU market 
averaging 2%. As with the other Windward Islands most of their exports went to the 
UK. In 1991 the value of these exports was $30 m., 59% of export earnings. 
Production absorbs 43% of the agricultural labour force. 
By contrast Grenada has experienced a slight fall in its exports to the EU, down from 
9,294 tonnes in 1982 to 6,015 tonnes in 1992, with a consequent fall in market share 
from 0.5% to 0.1%. Banana exports to the EU, its only market, earned $3.7 m. in 
1991, 19% of merchandised exports. Unlike the other Windward Islands cocoa and 
nutmeg are more import export crops than bananas, and their production only 
involves 7% of the agricultural labour force. 
The real wholesale price obtained in the UK rose by approximately 50% over the 
period 1966 to 1986 (Thomas), although in part this is affected by a change to the 
supply of higher cost higher quality produce. These trends contrast with the more 
volatile world free market price (Fig.6). Most of the fluctuation in Windward Island 
earnings from banana exports therefore arises from variability in the volume of 
exports, which as we have seen have been increasing. 
Although bananas are of considerable significance to all of the Windward Island 
economies the industry has developed few forward or backward linkages. Inputs are 
imported and little processing is required before export. Farmers' earnings from 
banana production have not been channeled into alternative crops nor into tradeable 
manufactures. Dependence on banana production therefore remains high, except in 
Grenada. Although the Island governments have been attempting to improve their 
competitiveness with dollar bananas by increasing yields and reducing post-harvest 
loses, they have also been encouraging diversification of their agricultural sectors. In 
Dominica potato production has been encouraged to substitute for imports and in 
St.Lucia locally grown fresh vegetables to supply the tourist industry. To replace 
bananas as the dominant export crop Dominica and St.Lucia have promoted the 
production of mangos, grapefruits, avocados and oranges. However these attempts 
have met with only limited success. Bananas remain a far more attractive crop, with 
their labour-intensive capital-saving production and quick returns. Unlike the newly 
promoted crops, bananas are efficiently marketed through the Producers Associations 
and Geest. Further the high banana prices of recent years have undermined any 
attempt to encourage farmers to diversify (Thomas 1989b). 
However these high prices have been dependent on the existence of their preferential 
access to the EU market. Davenport and Page (1991) have estimated that even with a 
quota on dollar bananas and with a CET of 14%, St.Lucia and St.Vincent would lose 
25% of their export volume and 35% of their export earnings. While with only a CET 
of 14%, and no ACP preference, these two countries would lose about 55% of their 
exports and 70% of their earnings. 
The EU Banana Regime 
The Fourth Lomé Convention had committed the EU to ensuring that "no ACP state 
shall be placed as regards access to its traditional markets and its advantages on those 
markets in a less favourable position than in the past or at present." However in the 
negotiations of the Uruguay Round of the GATT the EU committed itself to the 
"fullest possible liberalisation of trade in tropical products." As these difficult 
negotiations continued they inevitably began to interact with the discussions taking 
place to establish a new Banana regime for the single European market. The threat 
existed of a challenge by the Latin American countries, under GATT procedures, to 
any adoption of quota system. Indeed the EU was already constrained by the existing 
GATT rules not to raise the average tariff on bananas. Thus the elimination of the 
German tariff-free quota on dollar bananas would require an offsetting reduction in 
any CET from 20% to 14%. 
The Commission's response to the need for a Banana Protocol was not issued until 
August 1992 (COM 359/92). The new scheme was to be a combination of deficiency 
payments and import quotas. For the EU's own producers (Guadeloupe, Martinique, 
Canaries, Madeira and Crete) deficiency payments would be limited to 854,000 
tonnes (cf. imports of 645,000 tonnes in 1990); ECU 1,000 per hectare would also be 
offered as compensation to any farmer who ceased production. ACP imports from the 
eleven traditional suppliers would continue to enter duty-free up to their 1990 level; 
but any greater volume of `non-traditional' ACP imports and all dollar bananas, would 
be subject to a basic quota of 2 m. tonnes. This would be increased if projected 
demand and supply conditions in the EU market suggested that a shortage might 
emerge. The proposal also introduced the `partnership principle' whereby 30% of 
import licenses would be reserved for importers who have established a partnership 
agreement with an ACP or Community supplier. As import licenses generate 
monopoly rents for importers, the Commission anticipated cross-subsidisation 
between the profits acquired from the import of dollar bananas and those from the 
import of EU and ACP fruit. It also provides some protection to ACP suppliers from 
predatory activities by `dollar' importers. However in the face of strong opposition 
from Germany and the Benelux countries and with the GATT negotiations seeking to 
remove non-tariff barriers to trade, the import quota proposal had to be abandoned. 
The final version of the new banana regime (CEC 404/93) preserved duty-free access 
for ACP imports up to their traditional level. Traditional imports were initially limited 
to 622,000 tonnes, but the final figure is much more generous at 1.7 m. tonnes. This is 
now defined as the best ever import figure for each ACP state before 1991 and allows 
for existing expansion plans where appropriate (ie. Jamaica, 105,000 tonnes; St.Lucia 
127,000 tonnes; St.Vincent 82,000 tonnes; Grenada 14,000 tonnes; Dominica 71,000 
tonnes). This method of calculating the import limit will only constrain Jamaica in the 
short-run, but given the rising export trend for St.Lucia, St.Vincent and Dominica, it 
must represent a serious constraint in the long term unless the EU concedes an upward 
revision. 
For dollar banana imports and ACP imports in excess of their traditional level the EU 
adopted a tariff quota of 2 m. tonnes, subsequently revised to 2.2 m. tonnes for 1995-
96. Within this limit imported dollar bananas will pay a duty of ECU 75 per. tonne, 
and `non-traditional' ACP bananas will continue to enter duty-free. Imports greater 
than 2.2 m. tonnes will be subject to a tariff of ECU 850 per.tonne (a rate of 170%) on 
dollar bananas and ECU 750 per. tonne on `non-traditional' ACP bananas. The overall 
quotas total 3.71 m. tonnes, compared with imports of 3.71 m. tonnes in 1991. 
Even with a ECU 100 per tonne tariff advantage it would be unlikely that importers 
would substitute non-traditional ACP bananas for dollar fruit as part of their 2.2 m. 
tonne quota. Therefore to guarantee their market share the `partnership principle' is 
formally abandoned but replaced by the simple reservation of 30% of the licenses 
within the 2 m. tonne import quota for importers of `traditional' ACP and EU bananas. 
This will provide an incentive to ensure access to the EU market for ACP fruit in 
order for the importer to continue to retain their valuable license to import the more 
profitable dollar bananas. Nonetheless there remains the concern that the substantial 
profit margins likely to be made on quota dollar bananas may allow cross 
subsidisation for the import of non-quota dollar fruit and the capture of additional 
market share. Thus whether the proposed safeguards prove adequate remains to be 
seen. The remaining elements of the Regulation, which came into force on the 1st. 
July 1993, followed the original proposal. 
The German government and Benelux importers attempted to challenged the legality 
of this Regulation before the European Court, but without success, although a second 
case may be presented. Also, as expected, the Latin American banana exporters 
initially requested the Protocols reference to the GATT panel. Only Guatemala 
pursued the objection and subsequently the GATT panel ruled against the regime. 
However in the face of opposition from the EU and ACP states the ruling could not be 
adopted by GATT; although it has thrown doubt upon the broader ACP preferences 
under Lomé and their future under the new World Trade Organisation. 
At the same time as introducing a Banana Regime to control imports into the 
Community, the Commission has proposed additional assistance for those ACP 
countries that are likely to be adversely affected by the new regime (COM 465/92). 
Lomé IV had anticipated the problems for banana producers with the advent of the 
single market by offering financial assistance for diversification from its substantially 
increased ECU 1500 m. STABEX fund. This offers grants to compensate for 
destabilising reductions in export earnings from the sale of any of 49 products. For the 
island economies products will be eligible if they formed more than 1% of a States 
export earnings, which will be the case with bananas. However the Commission 
wished to go further in assisting the ACP countries to adjust to the new market 
conditions after 1993. They therefore proposed that financial assistance is made 
available to those ACP states that prepare programmes to improve the quality, 
marketing and competitiveness of their bananas. These funds will however be limited 
to ECU 30 m. to be allocated over a three year period to eleven eligible states. In 
addition they proposed that specific income support funds should be made available to 
these ACP countries should STABEX transfers be insufficient to compensate for the 
loses experienced as banana prices fall. However it is intended that such assistance 
should only be temporary and continue only until stability returns to the banana 
market. Overall EU aid to the ACP producers is likely to total ECU 60 m. over a three 
year period, as compared with support of ECU 185 m. for EU producers. This special 
aid package was adopted in September 1994. 
Conclusion 
The changes to the EU banana market have been profound for a number of small and 
economically vulnerable ACP island economies. These changes have been driven by 
the demands of the establishment of the single European market but have also been 
influenced by the long drawn out negotiations of the Uruguay round of GATT. The 
problems of meeting competition from Latin American bananas is going to be severe 
for most of the Windward islands and yet the difficulties of attempting to diversify 
away from dependence upon this crop are equally problematic. The EU appears as 
unclear in the strategy that it wishes to encourage these islands to follow as are their 
own governments. It is prepared to fund programmes that improve the 
competitiveness of island bananas in the EU market while at the same time funding 
attempts at diversification. However it is clear from Thomas's studies that banana 
cultivation in the Windward islands will always be at a disadvantage compared with 
the plantation production of Latin America, while diversification will continue to be 
inhibited by the relative attractiveness of banana cultivation. For Guadeloupe and 
Martinique, their status as Overseas Territories of France will offer some protection; 
already as EU suppliers they will receive deficiency payments under the Banana 
Protocol. For Jamaica its larger economy may be able to absorb the adverse impact of 
a loss of EU market share. However for Dominica, St.Lucia and St.Vincent 
adjustment may prove much more difficult and their external status leaves them more 
vulnerable. As ACP mini-states their future may depend to a considerable degree 
upon the importance that the UK government attaches to their long term economic 
development. 
Already there are signs of the difficulties that these islands may face. For Dominica 
banana exports in 1992 were 10% below expectations and grew only 2.7% to 55,500 
tonnes in 1993. For St.Lucia and St.Vincent the situation has been even worse, with 
falls of 10% and 25% in banana exports between 1992 and 1993 to 120,129 tonnes 
and 58,771 tonnes respectively. These reductions were attributed to weak 
international demand. In September 1994 hurricane Debbie devastated the banana 
crops, reducing production by 40%. Although it strengthened prices it also reinforced 
the diversion of sourcing to `dollar' producers. For Geest the competition from dollar 
imports, with substantial price cutting, were unsustainable. In 1995 Geest sold it's 
banana interests to a joint venture between it's rival Fyffes and the Windward Islands 
Banana Development Company. 
Meanwhile in the US legal action has been taken under Article 301 of the Omnibus 
Trade Act, which requires the US government to identify those countries undertaking 
unfair trading practices and authorises unilateral retaliatory trade restrictions if they 
continue. But the greatest challenge to the new Regime has been the complaint 
registered with the new World Trade Organisation by the United States and four Latin 
American countries. In March 1997 the Disputes Panel issued it's interim report which 
found that "fundamental elements" were inconsistent with WTO obligations. 
Specifically it has ruled against the guarantee of 30% of the EU market for traditional 
ACP exporters and the differential treatment of banana exports from Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela compared with the rest of Latin America. It also 
criticises the size of the ACP quotas as being well above their maximum exports in 
the past. However the report accepts the principle of preferential tariffs for ACP 
banana exports and supports the exemption of the Lomé Convention from the full 
force of WTO rules. Although unlike GATT decisions the EU is obliged to accept 
WTO rulings, further negotiations are likely, with the possiblity of an approach to the 
Appeals Tribunal. 
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